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A Canadian Model
of Corporate Governance
Where do shareholders really stand?
Insights from leading practitioners
reveal conflicting opinions.
Carol Liao
SJD/PhD Candidate, University of Toronto and University of British Columbia (Joint Program)
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1 My thanks to the following senior legal practitioners who generously contributed their time and expertise to the study: William M. Ainley, Davies Ward
Phillips & Vineberg LLP; Rita C. Andreone, Q.C., Lawson Lundell LLP; Jeff Barnes, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP; Noralee Bradley, Osler, Hoskin &
Harcourt LLP; William J. Braithwaite, Stikeman Elliott LLP; Terrence Burgoyne, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Rob Collins, Blake, Cassels & Graydon
LLP; Douglas G. Copland, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP; Dallas L. Droppo, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP; Aaron S. Emes, Torys LLP; Jean Fraser, Osler,
Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Sharon C. Geraghty, Torys LLP; Mitchell H. Gropper, Q.C., Farris, Vaughan, Wills & Murphy LLP; Stephen Halperin, Goodmans
LLP; Carol Hansell, Hansell LLP; Doug H. Hopkins, Boughton Law Corporation; Michael L. Lee, Lawson Lundell LLP; Robert Lehodey, Q.C., Osler,
Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Jon Levin, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP; Andrew J. MacDougall, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; R. Hector MacKay-Dunn,
Q.C., Farris, Vaughan, Wills & Murphy LLP; Margaret C. McNee, McMillan LLP; D. Shawn McReynolds, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP; William
K. Orr, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP; Barry J. Reiter, Bennett Jones LLP; Simon A. Romano, Stikeman Elliott LLP; Richard A. Shaw, Q.C., ICD.D.,
Richard A. Shaw Professional Corp.; John Smith, Lawson Lundell LLP; Rene R. Sorell, McCarthy Tétrault LLP; Tom Theodorakis, McMillan LLP; Edward
J. Waitzer, Stikeman Elliott LLP; and Marvin Yontef, Bennett Jones LLP. It should be noted that participants spoke for themselves and not necessarily for
the organizations with which they are affiliated. Their participation should not be construed as an endorsement of the findings highlighted in this article.
2 There was disagreement among the practitioners as to whether or not this was a meaningful difference in practice.
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“

Whether by choice or through the process of

elimination, the securities commissions are now

playing a major role in shaping Canadian corporate
governance practices.

which provides a broader right of
action for minority shareholders and
other non-shareholder stakeholders.3
Landmark decisions by the Supreme
Court of Canada have emphasized
these statutory differences,4 causing
many practitioners to inform boards
that they can – and indeed should –
take into account non-shareholder
value issues. Stakeholder interests may
have always had a role in governance
under Canadian statutory laws, but the
courts have now generated a need for
boards to document their process of
considering those interests.
Despite the fact that Canadian
statutes and common law have tended
to favour a more stakeholder-friendly
model that assumes greater board control, the legislators and the courts have
not proven to be significant leaders in
the development of corporate governance standards. Eliciting legislative
change is an extremely slow progression and corporate legislation operates
on a jurisdictional basis. Substantial
corporate cases in Canada are also few
and far between, and along with the
business judgment rule,5 Canadian
courts simply do not have the instrumentalities to promote good governance standards.

”

Power and Influence of
Securities Regulators
Whether by choice or through the
process of elimination, the securities
commissions are now playing a major
role in shaping Canadian corporate
governance practices. By virtue of the
fact that the securities commissions
have a public interest jurisdiction to
protect the capital markets,6 and by
design are investor-focused, their
influence has pushed Canada toward
a more shareholder-centric model of
governance. Securities regulators have
increased shareholders’ rights well beyond what has ever been contemplated
under Canadian corporate law.
Many of the surveyed practitioners
found it a curious Canadian phenomenon that the securities regulators are
significantly affecting the corporate
legal sphere. Practitioners recounted
how over a decade ago when the
securities regulators initially began
encroaching on a space that was traditionally for the legislatures and the
courts, it was extraordinarily controversial. Now, people seem to have
moved past the notion that the securities commissions are overstepping
their jurisdiction and have generally
accepted the regulators’ role in shap-

ing Canadian corporate governance.
Since the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) are able to act on
a coordinated basis across the nation,
the organization has become a very
convenient place to deal with change.
Institutional investors deliberately seek
out the CSA to enhance shareholder
rights, even if, from a philosophical
perspective, corporate legislation is the
more appropriate venue.
Practitioners cited some notable
disadvantages to having the regulators dominate corporate governance
in Canada. Several pointed to the fact
that the commissions have often disregarded findings from the courts, are
not well-versed in evidentiary rules,
and often fail to establish principles
that can guide lower courts. A few felt
that there was no need for securities
regulators to interfere with the carefully engineered corporate structure,
with one practitioner voicing the
common sentiment that “what’s in the
best interest of the shareholder doesn’t
align with better governance – that’s
where [the practice] falls down.”
Current Debate on Shareholder
Rights Plans
Canada is considered a very bidderfriendly jurisdiction. National Policy
62-202 Take-Over Bids – Defensive
Tactics leaves Canadian boards with
a limited number of defenses when
faced with an unsolicited takeover
bid.7 This position is now under review in Canada. The CSA has released
proposed National Instrument 62-105
Security Holders Rights Plans (NI 62105), which would allow target boards

3 S. 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44.
4 Specifically, Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise, 2004 SCC 68 and BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69.
5 The business judgment rule means that courts will defer to the directors’ business judgment so long as those directors used an appropriate degree of
prudence and diligence in reaching a reasonable business decision at the particular time the decision was made. See Peoples, supra note 4 at paras 64-65.
6 S. 127(1), para 3 of the Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S-5.
7 National Policy 62-202 Take-Over Bids – Defensive Tactics, online: Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/en/13274.htm>.
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to implement shareholder rights
plans (known as “poison pills”)8 for a
longer period than currently permitted when facing a hostile bid, subject
to shareholder approval.9 An alternative proposal has been put forth by
the Autorité des marchés financiers
(AMF), the organization mandated
by the Quebec government to regulate Quebec’s financial markets.10 The
AMF proposal seeks a new regime to
govern all defensive measures, allowing boards a greater overall arsenal to
defend target companies in the face of
unwanted takeover bids. The extended
comment period for these proposals
closed in July 2013.
As one practitioner observed:
The proposals can be seen as a
subtext of who actually should have ultimate decision-making authority in the
context of change of control transactions:
whether it should be the shareholders,
which is the current approach of the
securities regulatory scheme and the approach the commissions have traditionally taken on poison pills, or whether
the boards should be more empowered,
which is the path the courts seem to have
taken but the regulators have not.
An overwhelming majority of the
practitioners did not support the trend
of greater shareholder control, and
preferred the AMF proposal. Interestingly, the priorities of the regulators
and these practitioners are very much
aligned: getting the highest value for
shareholders. But while the regulators have tended towards increasing
shareholder rights in order to accomplish that goal, the practitioners in
the study felt that action is misplaced.

They contend that directors are in the
best position to unlock share value, as
it is their fiduciary duty to act in the
best interests of the corporation, but
directors are being denied the proper
tools to do so.
The practitioners’ concerns tended
to focus on how the regulators have
elected to protect shareholder value.
They argued it should not be done
through shareholder approvals, but
through greater powers bestowed on
the board to exercise their duties to the
corporation.
If indeed the AMF proposal is taken
to be the position by securities commissions across Canada, which some
practitioners predicted as unlikely, that
would be a significant step away from
how Canadian governance is currently
forming in the M&A context. Indeed,
as one practitioner put it, “the shareholder primacy model has different
ingredients to it,” meaning “there are
some elements that are stronger than
in others,” and most importantly, “the
sands on this can shift.”

nance norms and culture are becoming
quite well-developed, the frequent pull
in different directions from the regulators and influential power sources in
Canada have left Canadian governance
in a “period of uncertainty – we’re still
trying to figure out what the model
should be.”
The common law has made the
process of considering stakeholders
in the best interests of the corporation more overt, well beyond what
is assumed in Anglo-American
corporate legal scholarship. Layered
onto this corporate legal base, the
securities commissions have provided
other measures to bolster the field
of corporate governance in Canada,
while seeking to protect the integrity
of the capital markets and the interests
of investors within those markets. It
remains to be seen – from the pending
determinations regarding the CSA’s
proposed NI 62-105 and the AMF
proposal – whether the regulators will
be tempering their positions toward
shareholder primacy in the future.

Toward a Canadian Model
Practitioners’ views on an overall
Canadian model seemed to depend in
large part on what each practitioner
found most compelling: the constancy
of the corporate statutes and trajectory
of the common law, or the power and
influence held by the regulators.
The conflicting theoretical positions
from the courts and the securities commissions have enriched the dialogue on
the current environment of Canadian
corporate governance. While most
practitioners felt that Canadian gover-
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8 A shareholder rights plan is a defensive tactic employed by companies to discourage hostile takeovers. This is done by making the shares of a company less
attractive to the potential acquirer, either by allowing existing shareholders to buy more shares at a discount, or allowing shareholders to buy the acquirer’s
shares at a discounted price after the merger.
9 Canadian Securities Administrators, “Notice and Request for Comment: Proposed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holders Rights Plans, Proposed
Companion Policy 62-105CP, and Proposed Consequential Amendments” (14 March 2013), online: <www.osc.gov.on.ca>.
10 Autorité des marchés financiers, “Consultation Paper: An Alternative Approach to Securities Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics” (14 March
2013), online: Autorité des marchés financiers <www.lautorite.qc.ca>.
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